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Inequality and Procedural Justice
in Social Dilemmas
Ozan Aksoy
Jeroen Weesie
Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, The Netherlands
This study investigates the inﬂuence of resource inequality and the fairness
of the allocation procedure of unequal resources on cooperative behavior in
social dilemmas. We propose a simple formal behavioral model that incorporates
conﬂicting selﬁsh and social motivations. This model allows us to predict how
inequality inﬂuences cooperative behavior. Allocation of resources is manipulated
by three treatments that vary in terms of procedural justice: allocating resources
randomly, based on merit, and based on ascription. As predicted, procedural
justice inﬂuences cooperation signiﬁcantly. Moreover, gender is found to be an
important factor interacting with the association between procedural justice and
cooperative behavior.
Keywords: game theory, procedural justice, social dilemmas
1. INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas are situations where individual interests and
collective interests are in conﬂict. One example is the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD). In the PD, every party involved would be better off by
joint cooperation. As decisions are taken individually, however, each
party has an incentive to defect, with a Pareto-inferior outcome at
the group level as the unintended consequence due to joint defection
(Dawes, 1980). Real world situations that can be represented as PDs
are numerous (Kollock, 1998). For example, a wide array of public
goods such as well-functioning labor unions or a clean environment
can be studied within the PD framework. In these phenomena, each
individual has an incentive not to contribute to the public good
Address correspondence to Ozan Aksoy, Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht
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while enjoying the beneﬁts without costs. If everyone behaves in this
manner, however, the collective outcome is socially undesirable.
The PD received great interest from researchers, but most attention
is devoted to situations where actors are equal in terms of their
resources. However, many real life interactions that yield cooperation
problems are asymmetric (De Jasay, Güth, Kleimt, and Ockenfels,
2004). Thus, in employer-employee relations or in interethnic
encounters where one party can mobilize more resources than the
other, our understanding of cooperation problems is incomplete unless
we take this asymmetry into account.
The few existing studies that investigate the effects of inequality on
behavior in social dilemmas are equivocal. Some ﬁnd that participants
with larger endowments cooperate more than those with lower
endowments (Van Dijk and Wilke, 1995; Rapoport, 1988); others ﬁnd
the exact opposite (Rapoport, Bornstein, and Erev, 1989). These mixed
results constitute the motivation of this article.
As Smith, Jackson, and Sparks (2003) put it, one reason of
these conﬂicting ﬁndings could be the differences in the perceptions
of participants about the reasons of inequality. Justice research
shows that the procedure through which resources are allocated may
inﬂuence people’s reactions. When the inequality is perceived as
legitimate or when the allocation procedure is fair, people perceive
the situation as fair even though the outcomes are personally adverse
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Smith et al. (2003) compared merit-based
and random allocations and showed that the reasons of inequality
affected cooperative behavior. In this article, we introduce one further
manipulation, allocating resources via a more illegitimate way than
random allocation, that is, through ascription. In real life, randomly
occurring inequalities are rather rare, and a more compelling way to
create illegitimate allocation is allocation by ascription. Would similar
mechanisms be at work when afﬂuence is obtained by ascription and
by pure luck?
In addition to the legitimacy of inequality, we believe that the
conﬂicting results in the literature can be unraveled theoretically
by deﬁning and modeling conﬂicting interests of individuals more
precisely. In a social dilemma, individual motives such as greed
and selﬁshness are active simultaneously with social motives that
result from feelings of efﬁciency, fairness, and group well-being (Eek,
Biel, and Gaerling, 1998; Wilke, 1991). Using models to represent
these conﬂicting interests and analyzing interaction situations using
game-theoretic tools allow us to come up with detailed predictions
on the inﬂuence of inequality on cooperative behavior. In this article,
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we use a simple formal model and show that this model is fruitful in
understanding behavior in asymmetric social dilemmas.
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1. Decision Situation
To introduce inequality in the PD and simultaneously express this
inequality to participants in a substantial and comprehensive way, we
propose an asymmetric investment game (Fig. 1a). In an asymmetric
investment game, two actors face an opportunity to form a partnership.
Actors have certain budgets ( 1 and  2  that need not be equal. Each
actor can invest or decide not to invest the budget. Total investment
is multiplied by a rate of returns   >1  and redistributed to actors.
The ﬁrst actor gets a share of  1 from the common budget after
investment, whereas the other actor gets  2   1 +  2 = 1, regardless
of his/her own investments. In an asymmetric investment game,
inequality is systematized by setting  1  =  2 and/or  1  =  2. Under
certain restrictions on  ,  , and  , an asymmetric investment game
is a PD, since individual interests suggest mutual disinvestment, but
both actors would be better off by joint investment.
Asymmetric investment game represents “objective” outcomes that
actors face in a social dilemma situation. In other words, an
FIGURE 1 (a) Asymmetric investment game, numbers in grey shaded cells
represent outcomes for actors 1 and 2, respectively; (b) actor 1’s payoffs after
transforming (a) into subjective utility, where   represents the value for the
cooperative option.
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asymmetric investment game constitutes the given decision matrix
which is known in advance by actors involved in the dilemma situation
(Kelley and Thibaut, 1978). However, in addition to these objective
outcomes, our game-theoretic model also includes a subjective utility
component which is represented by the utility model that we introduce
in the following.
2.2. Conﬂicting Interests
To formally deﬁne the conﬂicting selﬁsh and social motivations, we
use the following utility model:
U x c   = x + I  (1)
where x is the material or objective outcome that the actor gets, c
is the strategy implemented by the actor, and   represents utility
gained by choosing the cooperative option. I = 1i fc = Invest, I = 0i f
c = Not invest. Thus, the utility that actors try to maximize includes
both selﬁsh (x  and social (   motives.
This utility model is consistent with two interrelated micro-
behavioral theories. First, it is inline with the Kantian imperative
formulation (Hegselmann, 1988; White, 2004). In a PD, the
cooperative strategy maximizes the collective outcome when
implemented universally, thus cooperation in a PD can serve as the
Kantian categorical imperative which suggests “act according to a
maxim whereby at the same time you want this maxim to become
a universal law.” In this sense,   can be seen as the individual
Kantian parameter, which represents utility gained by complying
with the Kantian categorical imperative (Elster, 1989). This Kantian
interpretation of the utility model can be generalized also to non-PD
cases (see Harsanyi, 1980).
Second, in a PD,   can also be deﬁned as   =  c −  d, where  c
represents the extra utility that results from obeying the norm of
cooperation, and  d is the utility loss (-or depending on the sign
of the term-gain) that results from breaking the norm. Given this
representation, this utility model is a special case of the normative
model of Crawford and Ostrom (1995).1 The Kantian imperative and
1Crawford and Ostrom (1995) further differentiate between internal and external
sources of utility that result from obeying/breaking the norm of cooperation. In our
design, there is no external source which imposes the norm of cooperation, thus this
differentiation is not necessary. We thank an anonymous reviewer who reminded us of
this equivalence.
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the normative interpretations of (1) are equivalent in the PD case (see
Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, p. 590).
Finally,   can also be seen as utility gained from warm glow giving.
In this sense, this model is also similar to the social orientation model
(McClintock, 1972; Van Lange, 1991).
In our application, people may vary with respect to the value they
give to cooperation, that is,   is an individual parameter. We do not
set boundary values for  , that is,   ∈  −  +  . Those with  >0
are cooperators, and the extreme case where   →+  represents an
ideal situation where the actor is a perfect Kantian (Harsanyi, 1980).
Those with   = 0 are interested only in the outcomes for the self and
thus are selﬁsh. It is also possible that some actors have negative  ,
which implies spitefulness, that is, the desire to harm the opponent
or a motive to break the cooperation norm. Our predictions are robust
against the assumptions on the speciﬁc distribution of  .
Readers who are familiar with the experimental economics
literature may wonder why we use this speciﬁc social utility model
rather than another more popular one, for instance, an inequality
aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000).2 The ﬁrst reason is parsimony; the utility model that we
use is simpler than the inequality aversion models and most of the
other social utility models proposed in the literature. In contrast
to others, it involves only one unknown parameter and imposes a
simpler shape of the utility function. In addition, the predictions
derived from this utility model are robust against the assumptions
made on the speciﬁc distribution of the   parameter as well as actors’
information about the   of their interaction partners, which is not the
case for the inequality aversion models and for other more complex
models. Second, being a normative one, we think that this utility
model is sociologically more relevant than the outcome-based models
proposed mainly by economists. Finally, as we will elaborate more in
the discussion, inequality aversion models would do empirically rather
poor in our case, since inequality aversion motives, at least the ones
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
do not seem to be prominent social motives in the asymmetric PD, and
are unable to explain the pattern in our data.
2One can extend the list of possible alternative social utility models even further by
including many other utility models proposed in the literature. An overview of these
social utility models can be found in Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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2.3. Formal Behavioral Model
We assume that actors transform a given (asymmetric) investment
game into an effective decision matrix by replacing the objective
outcomes with the subjective utility represented by (1) (Kelley and
Thibaut, 1978; Fig. 1b). In our model, we assume that actors know
their own motivations but may not necessarily be certain about the
  of their interaction partners. After this matrix transformation, we
then apply the classical Nash-equilibrium concept to the effective
decision matrix, that is, we assume that people manifest equilibrium
behavior. The equilibrium of the effective decision matrix depends
both on the objective outcomes as well as the subjective utility
parameters of actors, that is,   of actors. The following theorem states
the behavioral predictions derived from the equilibrium solution of
this effective decision matrix.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium solution for an asymmetric
investment game with utility transformation stated in (1) prescribes
that actor i with social motive  i invests with probability
 
e
i   i  =

1i f  i >  i 1 −  i  
0 otherwise
(2)
 e
i   i  is independent of  j, i.e., the   of the interaction partner.
Proof. Denote ˜  e
2  2  for the subjective belief of actor 1 about the
probability that actor 2 chooses to invest, which depends on the
subjective utility matrix of actor 2, thus objective outcomes of actor 2
as well as  2. In this case, investing has a higher expected value for
actor 1 if and only if:
 1 >    1 +  1  2 −  1   1 +  2   ˜  
e
2  2  +  1 1 −  1   1 − ˜  
e
2  2   (3)
The right hand side of (3) simpliﬁes to  1 1 −  1  , which is
independent of  e
2  2 . Thus this theorem is valid for any subjective
probability assessment and any expectation about  2. 
Theorem 1 states that given the utility model given by (1) and
the asymmetric investment game, actors always have a dominant
strategy in the effective decision matrix, which is either defection
or cooperation. Thus, in our case, behavioral predictions of the
Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1968), and
(expected) utility maximization concepts are the same. Note that
Theorem 1 does not provide the equilibrium solution, but the predicted
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behavior derived from the equilibrium solution. Equilibrium is a
broader concept, which includes the behavior of actors as well as
expectations of actors with respect to the behavior of each other, and
all higher order expectations. The comparative statics of Theorem 1
yield clear predictions on the effects of inequality on cooperation.
The likelihood of cooperation,  e
i   i  monotonically,
H1: increases in share ( i), and
H2: decreases in budget ( i).
Thus, Theorem 1 unravels the differential effects of unequal
endowments on the likelihood of cooperation: the budget of actors
that they can invest in has a negative effect, whereas the share of
actors from the collective good has a positive effect on the likelihood
of cooperation.
In addition to those comparative statics, Theorem 1 also predicts
that:
H3: The higher the  i, the higher the likelihood of cooperation,  e
i   i .
Testing H3 directly requires estimates of  i, the subjective social
utility parameters of subjects, which is beyond the scope of this article.
However, using this prediction, the inﬂuence of procedural justice on
cooperation can be incorporated in the formal behavioral model.
2.4. Procedural Justice
Once the effects of structural parameters on the likelihood of
cooperation are established with Theorem 1, the inﬂuence of the
legitimacy of inequality on behavior can be incorporated in this
formal representation. Combining procedural justice theories with
framing theories on the effects of social context on individual motives
(Hertel and Fiedler, 1998), we claim that the legitimacy of inequality
inﬂuences the strength of the social motive,  , of actors.
Procedural justice refers to the perceptions of actors about the
fairness of the procedure through which resources are allocated
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Greenberg, 1987; Leventhal, 1976). When
the allocation procedure is fair, people perceive the situation as
fair even though the outcomes are personally adverse (Thibaut
and Walker, 1975). One important procedural mechanism that
affects perceptions about procedural justice is “setting ground rules”
(Leventhal, 1980). This principle requires explaining to potential
receivers the nature of available rewards and what must be done to
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attain them. According to this rule, legitimacy occurs if clear and
relevant evaluation criteria are deﬁned before the allocation takes
place and these criteria are communicated to the receivers. However,
if this principle is not satisﬁed, the allocation procedure is perceived
as unjust and thus the inequality becomes illegitimate. In turn,
this elicits dissatisfaction with the status quo and actors’ motives
shift in the direction of moving to a fairer allocation (Leventhal,
1980). As distributive justice scholars also argue, reactions of subjects
to unfair distributions can be incorporated in the utility model
represented in (1) (Greenberg, 1987). To model the case where actors
are clearly distinguished as advantaged and disadvantaged in terms
of their resources, we argue that the legitimacy of this inequality
inﬂuences the   of those who beneﬁt from this inequality differently
than those who suffer from it. More precisely, as the distribution
process becomes less legitimate, the   of advantaged parties increases
whereas the   of disadvantage parties decreases, and combining with
H3 we expect that:
H4a: The more illegitimate an allocation is, the more likely an actor
cooperates given that she is in the advantageous position.
H4b: The more illegitimate an allocation is, the less likely an actor
cooperates given that she is in the disadvantageous position.
H4 claims that those who beneﬁt from illegitimate inequality would
be more cooperative, whereas those who suffer from illegitimate
inequality would be less cooperative compared to the situation where
procedural justice is satisﬁed. Industrialized Western societies deﬁne
themselves as meritocratic societies, and the prevalent norm is that
social status should be, at least in principle, attained through merit
rather than ascription (Treiman, 1970). Thus, in our application we
claim, and verify empirically by a manipulation check, that if unequal
resources are allocated via merit, then the resulting inequality will
be perceived as legitimate. However, if resources are allocated by
pure luck, and even worse, afﬂuence is obtained by ascription, then
inequality is perceived as unfair and illegitimate.
There is already some evidence in the literature for H4a. Hoffman,
McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) show that in the ultimatum and
dictatorship games, when the proposer “earns” his/her position to be
a proposer by scoring high on a knowledge quiz, the proposer behaves
more selﬁshly compared to a situation where the proposer role is
assigned randomly. Unfortunately, Hoffman et al. (1994) do not assign
roles via ascription, thus we do not know how the proposers would act
if they obtained their position illegitimately.
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Finally, Smith et al. (2003) show that gender is an important factor
that interacts with the effects of inequality and procedural justice on
cooperative behavior. Various though speculative explanations of this
gender effect can be offered. For example, due to different socialization
practices, a provider or helper schema is activated more strongly
among men (Smith et al., 2003; Eagly and Crowley, 1986). In addition,
men might be more responsive to inequality and procedural justice
due to sensitivity to social status and hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto,
1999). Moreover, in line with these theoretical arguments, brain
research also has shown that men are more responsive in terms of
neural activity to perceived fairness compared with women (Singer
et al., 2006). Combining these, we also expect gender effects:
H5: The effect of legitimacy of inequality on behavior is larger for
men than women.
3. METHOD
3.1. Participants
One hundred thirty-four (82 women, 52 men) participants were
recruited using the Online Recruitment System for Economic
Experiments (ORSEE; Greiner, 2004) at Utrecht University. They
were offered on average 12 but were informed that this amount
might change depending on their decisions during the experiment.
3.2. Design
The basic design was three reasons of inequality (afﬂuence by merit,
random assignment, afﬂuence by ascription) by three inequality
conditions (three different asymmetric investment games). Also, a
symmetric investment game was included. A combination of within
and between subjects design was used as explained below.
3.3. Task and Procedure
Sessions were held in March 2007 in the ELSE lab at Utrecht
University on computer using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were assigned randomly to a cubicle where they could
not communicate with each other and identify with whom they were
dealing. The participants’ task was to decide whether to invest their
budgets or not.
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Participants ran through two examples and were quizzed to check
their understanding. The experiment began after each participant
veriﬁed answers and it was ensured that everyone understood the
task.
In all conditions, ﬁrst a symmetric investment game was played
with  1 =  2 = 500, and  1 =  2 =
1
2. Throughout the experiment,  
was ﬁxed at 1.5. After this game, each participant received two of the
three treatments where the allocation procedure was manipulated.
One of these was always the random assignment treatment, and
the other was either allocation by merit or allocation by ascription.
The order of these treatments was varied in two factors.
In the allocation by merit treatment a feeling that participants
deserved their advantageous or disadvantageous positions was
induced by the following description:
Parties who are more experienced in the stock exchange market, who
are more knowledgeable and experienced in economic and ﬁnancial
transactions, get more resources and obtain higher shares of proﬁt.
Knowledge about the economy is a key indicator of success in risky
businesses. Thus, in this section of the experiment, the budgets and
shares of proﬁt will be allocated according to your skills and knowledge
which are important in these kinds of investment and relevant for this
decision situation.
Then they received four questions asking for an estimate of the
inﬂation rate, growth rate, unemployment rate, and the increase rate
of the share prices of AEX (Amsterdam Stock Exchange) companies
in 2006. According to their Knowledge Grades, participants were split
into halves: top half with higher grades and bottom half with lower
grades. Participants in the top half had higher budgets and/or shares
and always randomly matched with participants from the bottom half
who received lower budgets and shares.
In the allocation by ascription treatment, participants were again
split into halves but this time according to the education levels
of their fathers. Every participant received questions about their
demographics after the symmetric game and before the allocation
procedure manipulations as a distractive task. One of those questions
was their fathers’ level and ﬁeld of education. In the allocation
by ascription condition, a feeling that participants did not deserve
their disadvantageous or advantageous positions was induced by the
following text:
We will give you budgets and shares not according to your own
knowledge and skills but according to your father’s level and ﬁeld of
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education. The level and ﬁelds of studies are sorted reﬂecting social
prestige. For example if your father is lower educated or working in
the social science ﬁeld, you will receive lower resources than the other
person whose father is higher educated or working in a more prestigious
ﬁeld such as engineering.
Then participants were again split in half: ones with higher educated
fathers and ones with lower educated fathers. If some participants are
tied in terms of education level, the prestige of the ﬁeld of education
is used to differentiate them. Participants in the top half with higher
educated fathers received higher budgets and/or shares and were
always matched with another person from the bottom half.
In the random assignment treatment, participants were randomly
divided into two; one half received higher budgets and/or shares and
the other half received lower budgets and/or shares.
After these manipulations, participants played three asymmetric
investment games per condition, with stranger matching, where
parameters were set to put one player in an advantageous position
in terms of at least one parameter. These games are (1)  1 = 600,
 2 = 400,  1 = 0 6,  2 = 0 4; (2)  1 = 500,  2 = 500,  1 = 0 6,  2 = 0 4;
(3)  1 = 600,  2 = 400,  1 = 0 5,  2 = 0 5.
After each of the three legitimacy treatments, participants were
asked to evaluate the fairness of the distribution of resources. In order
not to reveal the purpose of the experiment, participants were given
ﬁve adjectives: exciting, fair, confusing, comprehensible, unjust, and
boring and asked to indicate on scale of 1 to 5 to answer categories
 1 = not at all 5 = very  to what extent these adjectives described the
games played after the last legitimacy treatment.
Before ending the experiment, a third condition was applied for
ethical reasons and to balance the earnings of the participants at
the end. The roles in the allocation by merit or ascription treatments
were simply reversed. For example, participants that were previously
in the bottom half and received lower resources because of their
fathers’ low education received higher resources in this last treatment.
These treatments are not included in the analyses. The experiment
ended by debrieﬁng participants truthfully. On average, the whole
procedure took one hour.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Manipulation Check
The adjectives used for manipulation check were factor analyzed with
oblique oblimin rotation and “fair” and “unjust” loaded on the same
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factor. The correlations between these two variables vary from −0 52
to −0 58 depending on the legitimacy treatment type. One perceived
fairness measure was constructed by adding up answers given to these
two adjectives after reverse coding “unjust.”
Perceived fairness scores are 5 97 5 91, and 4.78 for allocation
by merit, random allocation, and allocation by ascription conditions,
respectively. Note that each participant rated the fairness after each
legitimacy treatment. A test of these differences was conducted using a
multilevel regression model. The differences of ascription/random and
ascription/merit are both signiﬁcant  p(two-sided) < 0 01 ; however,
the merit/random difference is not signiﬁcant. There is no signiﬁcant
gender effect, position effect, position∗gender, position∗allocation
procedure, and position∗gender∗allocation procedure interaction effects
on perceived fairness. We conclude that the legitimacy manipulations
were successful.
4.2. Behavioral Data
Since each participant made seven investment decisions and received
two legitimacy treatments, the data are analyzed using ﬁxed
effect logistic regression models (Fischer and Molenaar, 1995).
The dependent variable is cooperation/defection with a ﬁxed effect
for the participant  1 = cooperation 0 = defection . First a model is
ﬁtted for the entire sample. In addition, since we are interested in
gender differences in the inﬂuence of legitimacy manipulations on
cooperation, separate models are ﬁtted for men and women. Table 1
presents regression results as well as differences in coefﬁcients
between men and women. Note that besides separate effects of budget
and share parameters on the likelihood of cooperation, we do not
have a hypothesis about whether advantaged actors cooperate more
or less than disadvantaged actors. Consequently, we included the
interaction of advantageous position with the legitimacy of inequality
in a less conventional way in the regression models reported in
Table 1. Rather than including the direct effect of position and two
interaction variables that involve the interaction of position with two
of the three legitimacy dummies, we specify another model that is
mathematically equivalent. Models in Table 1 do not include the direct
effect of position but rather the interaction of all three treatment
dummies with position.
Overall, H1 and H2 are supported. The likelihood of cooperation
has a negative association with budget and a positive association with
share, although the inﬂuence of budget is more prominent for women
and the inﬂuence of share is more for men.
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TABLE 1 Fixed Effect Logistic Regression Models Predicting Cooperative
Behavior (1 = Cooperation, 0 = Defection), Conditional Maximum Likelihood
Estimates
Model Overall Men Women Men–Women
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Budget    , reference:   = 400
  = 500 −1.263∗∗∗ 0.414 −1.350∗ 0.705 −1.214∗∗ 0.522 −0.136 0.877
  = 600 −1.292∗∗∗ 0.493 −0.935 0.833 −1.546∗∗ 0.626 0.611 1.042
Share    , reference:   = 0 4
  = 0 5 0.264 0.312 0.218 0.527 0.318 0.393 −0.100 0.657
  = 0 6 0.945∗∗ 0.438 2.472∗∗∗ 0.872 0.365 0.540 2.107∗∗ 1.025
Treatment  ref. = Merit 
Random −0.898∗∗ 0.408 −2.346∗∗∗ 0.812 −.345 0.505 −2.001∗∗ 0.956
Ascription −0.897∗ 0.518 −2.328∗∗ 1.008 −.390 0.628 −1.938 1.187
Treatment × Position
Adv × Random 0.955 0.652 −0.734 1.237 1.529∗ 0.813 −2.263 1.480
Adv × Merit −0.130 0.720 −3.191∗∗ 1.372 1.033 0.897 −4.224∗∗∗ 1.639
Adv × Ascription 0.300 0.756 −0.664 1.351 0.552 0.947 −1.216 1.649
Equality condition 0.820 0.649 −0.486 1.190 1.157 0.800 −1.643 1.433
Period −0.078 0.063 −0.085 0.111 −0.097 0.080 0.012 0.136
Log likelihood −258.039 −84.099 −165.546
N (participants) 134 52 82
N (decisions) 938 364 574
Notes: “Equality condition” is a dummy for the symmetric game. “Period” is the period
in the experiment when the decision is made. The last two columns include differences
in coefﬁcients between men and women and their standard errors (SE).
∗p<0 1; ∗∗p<0 05; ∗∗∗p<0 01 for two sided tests.
Figure 2 provides a general overview of the inﬂuence of the
allocation procedure of inequality on cooperation: the signiﬁcance
tests are based on Wald tests for the models in Table 1, also in
the cases where the hypotheses involve linear combinations of
the reported coefﬁcients. Overall, in line with H4, disadvantaged
participants cooperated signiﬁcantly more when they received
their disadvantageous position by merit compared to both random
allocation (z =− 2 20, p(two-sided) < 0 05) and allocation by
ascription (z =− 1 73, p(two-sided) = 0 083). There is no signiﬁcant
difference between the random assignment and allocation by
ascription conditions for disadvantaged parties. For advantaged
participants, no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the legitimacy of inequality
on the likelihood of cooperation is found.
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FIGURE 2 Mean cooperative behavior (1 = cooperation, 0 = defection).
As expected, there are important gender effects. The pattern for
advantaged men is inline with H4a, although the differences are
insigniﬁcant. Advantaged women cooperated slightly more in the
random assignment condition compared to allocation by merit, yet
the difference is insigniﬁcant. In allocation by ascription condition,
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however, advantaged women cooperated less than the two other
conditions where only the difference between random assignment
is statistically signiﬁcant (z = 2 02, p(two-sided) < 0 05). Another
interesting ﬁnding is obtained for disadvantaged men; they cooperated
signiﬁcantly and dramatically more in allocation by merit compared
to both random assignment (z =− 2 89, p(two-sided) < 0 05) and
allocation by ascription (z =− 2 31, p(two-sided) < 0 05). Although
disadvantaged men cooperated more in allocation by ascription than
random assignment, this difference is highly insigniﬁcant. Hardly any
inﬂuence of the legitimacy of inequality on cooperation is observed
for disadvantaged women. When the differences in the effects of
the legitimacy of inequality on cooperative behavior between men
and women are tested, H5 is supported for mainly disadvantaged
participants. For advantaged participants, there is no signiﬁcant
difference between men and women in terms of the effect of the
legitimacy of inequality on cooperation. Note that the signiﬁcance
tests reported are obtained controlling for all other variables in the
models in Table 1, including budget and share. For all insigniﬁcant
test results, p(two-sided) > 0 1.
4.3. Additional Analyses
One may suspect that Knowledge Grades and participants fathers’
education levels may have direct effects on the likelihood of
cooperation. As a check, although not reported here, random effect
logistic regression models were ﬁtted, with random effects at the
participant level, and Knowledge Grade and father’s education as
participant level variables. These variables were found to have no
signiﬁcant effects on the likelihood of cooperation.
Finally, the order that the participants received the legitimacy
manipulations was found to have no effect on the likelihood of
cooperation.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Many naturally occurring social dilemmas, for example, cooperation
problems in employer-employee relations or interethnic encounters
where one party can mobilize more resources than the other, are
asymmetric. We showed that modeling conﬂicting interests of actors
explicitly and analyzing interaction situations formally provides a
better understanding of the inﬂuence of inequality on cooperation
and may unravel the reasons of conﬂicting results obtained in the
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literature. A simple utility model that includes conﬂicting selﬁsh
and social motives proved fruitful to predict cooperative behavior
among unequal actors: as the budget of actors that they can invest in
the collective good increases, the likelihood of cooperation decreases.
In contrast, as the share of actors that they get from the collective
good increases, the likelihood of cooperation also increases.
Besides this speciﬁc social utility model we used, there is a
bewildering list of other social utility models we could have considered
as well, for example, the inequality aversion models (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). See Fehr and Schmidt
(2006) for a detailed overview of different utility models proposed in
the literature. The normative/Kantian model that we use is relatively
simple; the predictions derived from this model are robust against
assumptions about the distribution of the unknown social motive
parmeter and actors’ information about the social motives of others.
At the same time, it received certain empirical support from our
data. Moreover, being a normative approach, this particular model is
sociologically most relevant. Different comparative statics predictions
would be obtained for the asymmetric investment game had different
utility models been used. For example, both inequality aversion
models predict that cooperation would be maximal under symmetry
where actors obtain equal outcomes in case of mutual cooperation,
that is, actors have equal shares in the asymmetric investment game.
Moreover, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model predicts no cooperation
at all in the games that we used in our experiments, unless actors
obtain equal outcomes in case of mutual cooperation.3 Clearly, these
predictions of the inequality aversion models are not supported by our
data, since cooperation is maximal when budget is minimal, and share
is maximal, that is, when the game is highly asymmetric. Inequality
aversion does not seem to be a prominent motive in the asymmetric
investment game. Thus, we think that the normative/Kantian utility
model that we use serves as a good theoretical base to understand the
nature of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.
3Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) utility function for an actor with an outcome allocation
 x y  for the self  x  and the other  y  is deﬁned as U = x −  max 0 x− y −
 max 0 y− x , where   and   represent sensitivities to advantaged and disadvantaged
inequality, respectively. Fehr and Schmidt further assume that   ∈  0 1  and  >  .
With the assumption of  >  , defection is a dominant strategy for at least one actor in
the asymmetric games that we use, and the single Nash equilibrium is mutual defection
unless the share parameters of actors are equal, i.e.,  1 =  2 = 0 5. Cooperation can be
an equilibrium only if the share parameters of actors are equal, and even in this case,
mutual defection still remains an equilibrium.
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In line with procedural justice theories and previous ﬁndings,
the legitimacy of inequality is found to be an important factor
inﬂuencing behavior in social dilemmas. We introduced an important
manipulation by allocating resources based on ascription, besides
random allocation, and allocation by merit. Our study shows that
allocation by ascription may elicit different type of responses than
random allocation. Naturally occurring illegitimate inequalities are
more often due to ascription rather than by pure luck, and behavioral
outcomes of this ascription-based allocation are socially and
scientiﬁcally more relevant (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee, 1991).
We also observed very interesting gender effects. Compared
to women, male behavior is in general more in line with our
hypotheses, although men seem to be more sensitive to the allocation
process when they are disadvantaged instead of advantaged. As we
predicted, the legitimacy of inequality inﬂuences male behavior
more strongly compared to women, yet only for disadvantaged
actors. For advantaged actors, gender differences are less prominent.
The association between the legitimacy of inequality and cooperative
behavior, and the interaction of gender with the legitimacy of
inequality, however, are not as straightforward as we hypothesized.
For example, at odds with our predictions, advantaged women
cooperated signiﬁcantly less when resources are allocated by
ascription compared to the situation where resources are allocated
randomly.4 Also, unexpectedly high cooperation rates are observed
among disadvantaged men, when inequality is due to merit.
We predict that disadvantaged actors would cooperate more when
inequality is due to merit compared to random allocation or allocation
by ascription, and this effect to be stronger for men. Thus, this
ﬁnding is not contradictory to our predictions. Yet, it is remarkable
that the cooperation rates for disadvantaged men in the merit
condition exceed by far the cooperation rates in any other condition.
Similar gender effects are also reported by Smith et al. (2003) and
particularly interesting since they point to different decision making
4One reviewer offered the fear-greed hypothesis (Simpson, 2003; Kuwabara, 2005)
as a possible explanation. This hypothesis claims that men defect in the PD in response
to greed, that is, to earn more; whereas women defect in response to fear, that is, to
avoid being exploited by cheaters. It is possible that under the ascription condition the
advantaged women fear that their partners will be defective because of the illegitimacy,
and due to this fear do not cooperate themselves. Although this explanation seems
plausible, Theorem 1 shows that the probability of cooperation does not depend on the
expectation about the behavior of the opponent in the asymmetric investment game.
Moreover, in our case, the greed component, (T-R), is always the same as the fear
component, (P-S).
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mechanisms among men and women. We think that more research
is needed before speculating about the reasons of these gender
differences, since hitherto explanations are unsatisfactory. It could
be that the legitimacy of inequality inﬂuences the motives of men
and women differently, or man and women may have different social
motives and utility functions. Alternatively, the differences are not
due to social motives but rather to other factors such as differences
in the norms about appropriate behavior under various allocation
procedures, divergent risk preferences, or a combination of those.
We leave investigating these mechanisms for future research.
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